

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Report submitted by Japan

Action 20 of the action plan contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons calls on States parties to submit regular reports on their implementation of the action plan and of the 13 practical steps towards disarmament contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”. Action 21 of the action plan states that, as a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. Japan submits this report in accordance with these commitments.

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Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
I. Nuclear disarmament			
I All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.	Summary of national policy on nuclear disarmament, including any relevant initiatives and actions which serve to illustrate the policy. Membership in regional multilateral groups that promote nuclear disarmament.	As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, Japan remains strongly committed to strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime on all of its three pillars, and moving closer towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Japan is of the view that, in order to make our way towards a world free of nuclear weapons, it is essential to build up practical and concrete measures on the basis of cooperation between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, while not losing sight of a clear recognition of the humanitarian aspects of the use of nuclear weapons and an objective assessment of the severe international security environment.	Japan has been playing an active role in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, a cross-regional group of non-nuclear-weapon States that is committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the essential foundation for the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, and has proposed concrete and effective measures to move forward with nuclear disarmament: – Japan is committed to making progress in concrete and practical measures by, among other things, promoting the transparency of nuclear forces, submitting resolutions to the General Assembly calling for united action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, making active contributions towards an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, pursuing the early commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as participating actively in discussions on nuclear disarmament verification; – Japan has been engaged in raising awareness of the reality of atomic bombings and clear recognition of its humanitarian consequences across borders and generations.

- 2 All States parties commit to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their treaty obligations.
- National policy on irreversibility, verifiability and transparency, including any relevant initiatives and actions which serve to illustrate the policy.
- Support for relevant General Assembly resolutions that support irreversibility, verifiability and transparency.
- Japan reaffirms the importance of the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of treaty obligations:
- Japan calls upon all States to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation through resolutions submitted to the General Assembly;
 - Japan submitted a working paper on nuclear-weapon State transparency to the 2015 Review Conference, which encouraged nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to submit it annually in the context of strengthening the Treaty review process;
 - Japan, with the other 11 members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted working papers on transparency to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty in 2012 and 2014 and to the 2015 Review Conference respectively. In the 2020 review process, the Initiative has remained committed to its efforts to increase transparency by submitting working papers on transparency to the Preparatory Committee in 2017 and 2018.

- 3 In implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapon States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.
- (Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)

4	The Russian Federation and the United States of America commit to seek the early entry into force and full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and are encouraged to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals.	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)
5	The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia:	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)
5 (a)	Rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in action 3;	

Action number	Duration	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Action taken by Japan
5 (b)		Address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process;	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)
5 (c)		To further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)
5 (d)		Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons;	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)
5 (e)		Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)
5 (f)		Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)
5 (g)		Further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)

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6	All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.	Support for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament, including through support for relevant draft programmes of work of the Conference, Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and or General Assembly resolutions. Participation in any working groups on nuclear disarmament	Japan supported the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament as a chair of the Conference in 2014. Japan also supported the decision put forward by the Sri Lankan President to establish subsidiary bodies on agenda items 1 to 4, and one on agenda items 5, 6 and 7, contained in document CD/WP.605 in 2018. Japan has consistently called for the adoption of a programme of work that leads to the negotiation of a disarmament treaty in the Conference, Mr. Nobushige Takamizawa, Ambassador of the Permanent Mission of Japan to the Conference, stressed the importance of adopting a comprehensive and balanced programme of work at the 1434th plenary meeting of the Conference, in 2018. The following political figures called on all members of the Conference in the recent high-level segments of this body to adopt such a programme of work: - Mr. Manabu Hori, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan in 2018 - Mr. Motome Takisawa, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan in 2017 - Mr. Masakazu Hamachi, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan in 2016 - Mr. Takashi Uto, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan in 2015 In the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", submitted by Japan and adopted by a substantial majority, Japan has for years stressed the need to continue to explore possibilities for overcoming the ongoing deadlock of more than two decades in the Conference on Disarmament

- 7 All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.
- Support for the establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to discuss effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, including through support for relevant draft programmes of work of the Conference, Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and or General Assembly resolutions.
- In the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", submitted by Japan and adopted by a substantial majority, Japan has stressed the importance of security assurances by nuclear-weapon States.
- Japan and the other 11 members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative submitted a working paper on "Nuclear-weapon-free zones and negative security assurances" to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty in 2013.
- Japan participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum Workshop on Promoting a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status of Mongolia, held in Mongolia in September 2015.
- Mr. Motome Takisawa, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, participated in the international conference on "Building a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World", which was hosted by Kazakhstan to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site.
- 8 All nuclear-weapon States (Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States) commit to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so are encouraged to extend security

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assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.			
9	The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is encouraged. All concerned States are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon free zones treaties, which include negative security assurances. The concerned States are encouraged to review any related reservations.	(For all States) National efforts to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. Support for relevant General Assembly resolutions and or Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers that support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Name of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty to which your country is party (For nuclear-weapon States) Summary of efforts (including current status and future prospects) to ratify the relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties or to review any related reservations on the ratification of such protocols. Current status of consultations and cooperation on entry into force of the relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zones	Japan contributed to drafting of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia by organizing expert meetings in Sapporo, Japan, in October 1999 and April 2000. Japan has organized the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues with the United Nations and nuclear-weapon-free zones have been one of the agenda items of discussion. Japan has contributed to the discussion and promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Japan participated as an observer in the second and third Conferences of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia. Japan has supported General Assembly resolutions regarding five treaties of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia. In the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", submitted by Japan and adopted by a substantial majority, Japan stressed the importance of the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with the 1999 guidelines of the Disarmament Commission. Mr. Yamada, Ambassador of Japan to Mexico, participated in the ceremony of the fiftieth anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). Japan hosted an unofficial conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in Nagasaki in December 2016.

10 All nuclear-weapon States undertake to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have the beneficial impact towards the ratification of that Treaty, and that nuclear-weapon States have the special responsibility to encourage Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify.

11	Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, all States commit to refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty, and all existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions should be maintained.	Date of signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Current status of the reporting State's policy on the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions.	Japan signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 8 July 1997. Japan amended its Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors when it ratified the Treaty. In the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", submitted by Japan and adopted by a substantial majority, Japan has continuously stressed the importance of the early entry into force of the Treaty and of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions. Japan served in an important role as an Article XIV Coordinator of the Treaty, together with Kazakhstan, from 2015 to 2017, stressing the importance of the early entry into force of the Treaty and of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions.
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Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
12	All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty recognize the contribution of the conferences on facilitating the entry into force of that Treaty and of the measures adopted by consensus at the Sixth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in September 2009, and commit to report at the 2011 Conference on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty.	Confirmation that commitment was met to report at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Article XIV Conference) held in 2011 on progress made towards the urgent entry into force of that Treaty. Summary of reports made at the subsequent Article XIV Conferences on progress made towards the entry into force of that Treaty.	September 2009–August 2011 <u>September 2009–August 2011</u> In bilateral consultations, Japan urged several Annex 2 States that had not yet signed or ratified the Treaty to do so at the earliest opportunity. March 2010 Japan invited an Indonesian Diet member and a government official to visit International Monitoring System facilities hosted by Japan and to exchange views on the Treaty with the Japanese authorities. March 2010 Japan invited an Egyptian delegation headed by the Director of the Egyptian National Data Centre to visit International Monitoring System facilities hosted by Japan and to exchange views on the Treaty with Japanese authorities. September 2011–August 2013 <u>September 2011–August 2013</u> Japan took every appropriate opportunity in its bilateral meetings with non-ratifying Annex 2 States to encourage those States to sign and or ratify the Treaty. June 2013–May 2015 <u>June 2013–May 2014</u> Japan took every suitable opportunity in its bilateral contacts with the remaining Annex 2 States to encourage the signature and or ratification of the Treaty. June 2014–May 2015 <u>June 2014–May 2015</u> Japan took every suitable opportunity in its bilateral contacts with the remaining Annex 2 States, at both the political and official levels, to encourage the signature and or ratification of the Treaty. See www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/article-xiv-conferences/.

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13	All States that have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty undertake to promote the entry into force and implementation of that Treaty at the national, regional and global levels.	Activities to promote the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the national, regional and global levels, in particular a summary of efforts to encourage all States that have yet to do so to sign and ratify the Treaty (e.g., positions on General Assembly resolutions; participation in Article XIV Conferences or Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ministerial meetings; participation in Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers and/or national, regional, multilateral activities). Summary of national efforts to fully implement the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (e.g., national legislation or policies). List any nationals who participate in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Group of Eminent Persons.	Japan, along with Kazakhstan, co-presided over the ninth Article XIV Conference, held on 29 September 2015 in New York. Since then, Japan, as the co-coordinator for the entry into force of the Treaty, has led and coordinated international efforts for the promotion of its entry into force. Japan hosted a Group of Eminent Persons meeting in Hiroshima, Japan, in August 2015 to discuss strategies for advancing the Treaty. Japan and Kazakhstan adopted the summit-level joint statement on the Treaty in Astana on 27 October 2015. Japan has co-chaired the ministerial meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty group, which convenes a high-level meeting biannually. On 21 September 2016, the eighth ministerial meeting was held in New York and adopted a joint ministerial statement. The State Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan attended the twentieth anniversary ministerial meeting of the Treaty, on 13 June 2016. Japan, together with Kazakhstan, supported a commemorative exhibition in Vienna, which outlined the history of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime. Japan hosted a regional conference in 2017 for States in South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East to promote the Treaty in that region. Japan co-sponsored and voted in favour of the annual General Assembly resolution entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty".
14	The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is to be encouraged to fully develop the verification regime for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including early completion and provisional operationalization of the	Summary of national efforts to construct, complete and/or certify International Monitoring System stations. Summary of national efforts to help the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization strengthen its verification regime (e.g., workshops, seminars, training, exercises, voluntary funding	All the International Monitoring System stations and a laboratory hosted by Japan (six seismological stations, one infrasound station, two radionuclide stations and one laboratory) have been certified by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. Japan made a voluntary contribution of approximately \$2.4 million to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to further boost its verification abilities in 2017. Japan made a voluntary contribution \$747,026 in 2011 and \$455,000 in 2013.

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
12/33	international monitoring system in accordance with the mandate of the Preparatory Commission, which should, upon entry into force of that Treaty, serve as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system with global reach, and provide assurance of compliance with that Treaty.	contributions and or in-kind contributions). Summary of national efforts to help develop the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization's on-site inspection capabilities.	Towards the entry into force of the Treaty, Japan has provided a global seismological observation training course since 1995 to introduce up-to-date technologies and knowledge in that field.
15	All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Also in this respect, the Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.	Support for launching negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including through support for relevant draft programmes of work of the Conference on Disarmament, General Assembly resolutions and or Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers. Summary of contributions to the Group of Governmental Experts on the subject. Summary of contributions to the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group.	Japan strongly supports the objectives of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, known as a fissile material cut-off treaty, and has called for the early commencement of negotiations on the treaty on numerous occasions, including in the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", which Japan has submitted to the Assembly every year. Japan, with the other member countries of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted a working paper on fissile material cut-off treaty to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty in 2012 and 2017. In 2011, Japan and Australia co-hosted experts' side events in Geneva on the margins of the Conference on Disarmament to discuss technical aspects of a treaty and to maintain momentum for a commencement of negotiations in the Conference. Japan, as a member of the Group of Governmental Experts on a fissile material cut-off treaty, actively participated in and contributed to discussions in the Group, which met in Geneva in four sessions of two weeks each in 2014 and 2015. Japan also has been engaged in the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group and contributed constructively to the discussions as a member of the group.

16 The nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

17 In the context of action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
18	All States that have not yet done so are encouraged to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.	(Applicable only to nuclear-weapon States)	
19	All States agree on the importance of supporting cooperation among Governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.	Any cooperation among Governments, the United Nations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament. Summary of national, regional and international efforts to promote greater transparency, confidence and efficiency in the verification of nuclear disarmament.	Japan has participated actively in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, which is an international initiative to further understand and find solutions to the complex challenges involved in the verification of nuclear disarmament, by sending experts to all working groups. Recognizing the Partnership as a strong vehicle for practical and concrete measures to realize the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, Japan hosted its third plenary meeting in Tokyo in June 2016. Japan has emphasized the importance of the efforts to develop nuclear disarmament verification capabilities in the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", which Japan submits to the Assembly every year. Japan, as co-sponsor, supported the General Assembly resolution entitled "Nuclear disarmament verification" and will actively participate in discussions of the group of government experts on nuclear disarmament verification that will be established pursuant to the resolution.

20

States parties should submit regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament", and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996,

Year and official document symbol of all regular reports on the implementation of article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

Japan submitted a working paper on transparency by non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the 2015 Review Conference, which encouraged nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to submit it annually in the context of strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process.

Japan, with the other members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted a working paper on non-nuclear-weapon State transparency, which included a draft reporting template for non-nuclear-weapon States, to the 2015 Review Conference.

Japan, with the other members of the Initiative, submitted working papers on transparency to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty in 2012 and 2014, respectively.

The previous reports of Japan on its implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference are contained in documents NPT CONF 2015 PC III 4 (2014) and NPT CONF 2020 PC I 9 (2017).

This report by Japan on the implementation of the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference updates our report of 2017.

21

As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to establish a publicly accessible repository, which shall include the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States.

(For nuclear-weapon States)
Any agreed standard reporting form and determined reporting intervals.
Summary of efforts to agree on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security.

(For non-nuclear-weapon States)
Summary of efforts to encourage the nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to determine an appropriate reporting interval

As a part of efforts to promote the implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference, Japan, with the other member countries of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, submitted three working papers on transparency to the Preparatory Committee in 2012 ("Transparency on nuclear weapons") and 2014 ("Increased transparency in nuclear disarmament") and to the 2015 Review Conference ("Transparency by non-nuclear-weapon States parties"), respectively.

In addition, Japan submitted a working paper on transparency, reporting and strengthening the review process to the 2015 Review Conference, proposing a text to be included in the final document of the 2015 Review Conference.

In 2017, Japan, with the other member countries of the Initiative, submitted a working paper ("Transparency by all States parties to the Treaty"), with a new reporting template that can be used by all States parties to provide information about how they have implemented their commitments under the action plan of 2010, to the Preparatory Committee in 2017.

Action number	Action	Examples of activities to include (if applicable)	Activities taken by Japan
22	All States are encouraged to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, in order to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons.	Summary of efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education (e.g., contributions to the report of the Secretary-General, adding the subject to school curriculums, seminars, conferences, exhibitions, partnerships with civil society, public events, social media events, contests).	As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings, Japan is committed to ensuring that the humanitarian consequences and tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki will never be forgotten. With this aim, Japan places utmost importance on disarmament and non-proliferation education, especially for the younger generation. Japan has invited young diplomats from various countries through the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme every year since 1983. Japan has sponsored the United Nations Conferences on Disarmament Issues in different cities since 1989, where representatives of States, the United Nations, academic institutions and civil society from around the world engage in useful discussions. Japan submitted a joint working paper on disarmament and non-proliferation education with the other members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2017, following a joint working paper submitted to the 2015 Review Conference. Japan also made a joint statement on disarmament and non-proliferation education on behalf of 76 countries at the 2015 Review Conference.
			Japan started a programme entitled "Special communicator for a world without nuclear weapons" in 2010 for the purpose of sharing the firsthand experience of atomic bombing survivors (hibakusha). In addition, Japan launched a new programme entitled "Youth communicator for a world without nuclear weapons" in 2013. Under this programme, young people are expected to share the tragic consequences of nuclear weapons and their thoughts about possible steps across borders and generations. Japan has undertaken efforts to make the testimonies of hibakusha more widely available and translated them into 13 languages. In 2015, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in cooperation with the Japanese Government, opened a permanent exhibition on the atomic bombings at the United Nations Office at Vienna, following those in New York and Geneva, to promote understanding of the terrible devastation caused by the use of nuclear weapons.

II. Nuclear non-proliferation

23	The Conference calls upon all States parties to exert all efforts to promote universal adherence to the Treaty, and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.	Summary of efforts to promote universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.	Japan took every opportunity in its bilateral meetings to encourage non-ratifying States in appropriate international forums. In paragraph 5 of the General Assembly resolution entitled "United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons", submitted by Japan, Japan called upon all States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accede as non-nuclear-weapon States to the Treaty promptly and without any conditions to achieve its universality and, pending their accession to the Treaty, to adhere to its terms and to take practical steps in support of the Treaty.
24	The Conference re-endorses the call by previous review conferences for the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with the provisions of article III of the Treaty.	Summary of safeguards agreements concluded with IAEA, such as a comprehensive safeguards agreement, Additional Protocol and/or Modified Small Quantities Protocol.	Japan signed the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in March 1977 and the Agreement entered into force in December 1977. Japan signed its Additional Protocol in December 1998 and it entered into force in December 1999.
25	The Conference, noting that 17 States parties to the Treaty have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, urges them to do so as soon as possible and without further delay.	Summary of efforts to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement, or to facilitate and encourage others to do so.	Japan continues to promote the universal acceptance of an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, together with the model Additional Protocol to the Agreement, as the international verification standard and calls upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and bring into force the Additional Protocol.

26	The Conference underscores the importance in complying with the non-proliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the safeguards system.	Summary of national efforts to comply with non-proliferation obligations. Examples of initiatives, including through Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers, that promote high international standards of compliance. Summary of IAEA conclusions about the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.	Japan has implemented the obligations of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between it and IAEA and the Additional Protocol to it and has been making efforts to ensure the transparency of its nuclear activities. "Broader conclusion" has been consistently drawn since it was drawn for the first time in the IAEA safeguards statement for 2003. Japan is committed to strengthening nuclear non-proliferation. In particular, as a designated member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan has been cooperating fully with IAEA and providing appropriate support to its activities.
27	The Conference underscores the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA statute and the respective legal obligations of Member States. In this regard, the Conference calls upon Member States to extend their cooperation to the Agency.	Summary of national steps taken to address cases of non-compliance with Non-Proliferation Treaty non-proliferation obligations, including the implementation of sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council or statements in relevant international forums, such as the IAEA General Conference or Board of Governors.	Japan implements sanctions upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (sanctions imposed by Security Council resolutions and unilateral sanctions). Japan has delivered statements on Democratic People's Republic of Korea issues in relevant international forums, such as the IAEA General Conference and Board of Governors. Japan has co-sponsored Democratic People's Republic of Korea resolutions at the IAEA General Conference. Japan has been contributing to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, including assistance through IAEA. In 2017, Japan supported the national training course on safeguards implementation in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
28	The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.	Date of signature and entry into force of an Additional Protocol agreement with IAEA. Summary of efforts to implement the Additional Protocol or to encourage and facilitate others to do so.	Japan has been actively working towards the universalization of the model Additional Protocol and continues to provide necessary assistance, especially for Asian countries. Japan has organized outreach events in some countries through the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security and supported IAEA safeguards seminars to facilitate safeguards implementation, including the Additional Protocol. Japan supported the seminars on promoting the conclusion of Additional Protocols held by IAEA in Ethiopia and the Sudan in 2017 and the seminars held under the joint auspices of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security and partner countries in Thailand and the Lao People's Democratic Republic in 2018.
29	The Conference encourages IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties in the conclusion and entry into force of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The Conference calls on States parties to consider specific measures that would promote the universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreements.	Summary of national, regional and/or multilateral efforts to promote or assist other States in concluding or implementing a comprehensive safeguards agreement	Japan has organized outreach events in some countries through the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security and supported IAEA safeguards seminars to facilitate safeguards implementation, including the Additional Protocol. At the time of the IAEA General Assembly in September 2017, Japan hosted a side event on the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the model Additional Protocol. Japan participated in and contributed to the annual meeting of the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Meeting Network, held in the Republic of Korea in October 2017.
30	The Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible.	Summary of support for efforts to apply safeguards more widely in nuclear-weapon States (e.g., Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers)	The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative presented a working paper on "Wider application of safeguards in the nuclear-weapon States" to the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty in 2013. http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000182256.pdf

<i>Action number</i>	<i>Actions</i>	<i>Examples of information to include (if applicable) – Actions taken by Japan</i>	
	taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.		
31	The Conference encourages all States parties with small quantities protocols which have not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.	Efforts to amend or rescind an existing Small Quantities Protocol.	Japan calls upon all States to adopt the modified Small Quantities Protocol, where relevant.
32	The Conference recommends that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.	Summary of efforts to review and evaluate IAEA safeguards, including efforts to support decisions to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards.	Japan works to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of IAEA safeguards. In particular, as a designated member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Japan supports the efforts of the Director General and Board to continually strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of those safeguards.
33	The Conference calls upon all States parties to ensure that IAEA continues to have all political, technical and financial support so that it is able to effectively meet its responsibility to apply safeguards as required by article III of the Treaty.	Summary of status of payment of assessed contributions to IAEA. Summary of extrabudgetary, voluntary and or in-kind contributions to IAEA.	Japan has been the second largest by scale of total payment of assessed, extrabudgetary and voluntary contributions to IAEA.

- 34** The Conference encourages States parties, within the framework of the IAEA statute, to further develop a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost-effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation among Member States and with IAEA.
- The Japan Support Programme for Agency Safeguards contributes to strengthening international safeguards through improvements in the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation by transferring Japanese technology and expertise to IAEA.
- The Japan Atomic Energy Agency operates the Clean Laboratory for Environmental Analysis and Research as a member of the IAEA safeguards network laboratories.
- 35** The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports are in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III of the Treaty, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.
- Summary of efforts in export control regimes (e.g., the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Wassenaar Arrangement), Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and its reporting mechanism and other arrangements (e.g., domestic legislation or bilateral agreements) that help to ensure nuclear-related exports do not lead to proliferation.
- Japan has redoubled its nuclear non-proliferation efforts through the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee, as well as through the implementation of obligations related to nuclear non-proliferation, such as the establishment of effective national export controls stipulated by Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Japan contributes positively to the activities of the Nuclear Suppliers Group by, for example, assuming the role of the Point of Contact through its Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna.
- 36** The Conference encourages States parties to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.
- Summary of the implementation of nuclear export control lists in domestic export control legislation and or regulations.
- Japan regularly updates its domestic export control regulations in accordance with changes in multilaterally agreed nuclear export control lists.

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
37	The Conference encourages States parties to consider whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations in making nuclear export decisions.	Summary of efforts to show that the safeguards and compliance record of a recipient State is taken into account in making nuclear export decisions.	Japan, in accordance with multilaterally agreed guidelines, considers whether a recipient State has brought into force IAEA safeguards obligations when making its export decisions.
38	The Conference calls upon all States parties, in acting in pursuance of the objectives of the Treaty, to observe the legitimate right of all States parties, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear material, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes.	Support for the legitimate right of States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, such as by providing a list of States with which nuclear cooperation agreements have been completed.	Please refer to the following blue book on Japanese foreign policy regarding the list of countries with which Japan has bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook_2017/html/chapter3/c030104.html → “(4) Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: B Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement”
39	States parties are encouraged to facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty, and to eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.	Summary of key policy criteria considered when determining whether or not to engage in nuclear cooperation with a State.	Please refer to the following blue book on Japanese foreign policy regarding its policy on nuclear cooperation: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook_2017/html/chapter3/c030104.html → “(4) Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: B Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement”

40	The Conference encourages all States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities.	Summary of efforts to strengthen the physical protection of nuclear facilities, particularly by the national regulatory agency. Summary of efforts undertaken to implement commitments made in the Nuclear Security Summit process.	The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit was the occasion to announce various efforts made by Japan. Please see the following page for a summary of efforts: http://www.mofa.go.jp/dns/n_s/ne/page3e_000467.html
41	The Conference encourages all States parties to apply, as appropriate, the IAEA recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225 Rev.4 (Corrected)) and other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date.	Summary of efforts to apply the IAEA INFCIRC/225 Rev.4 (Corrected). Timeline for any planned national reviews of physical protection policies and practices or any reviews that have been accomplished.	Japan takes various physical protection measures in line with the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors, etc. Those measures have been recommended in IAEA guidance documents, including Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225 Rev.5) and INFCIRC/225 Rev.4 (Corrected), and other relevant international instruments. With reference to the requirements in INFCIRC/225 Rev.5 and other relevant international instruments, the International Physical Protection Advisory Service mission in 2015 recognized that Japan has a robust and sustainable nuclear security regime, significantly enhanced in recent years. The latest measure was the revision of Nuclear Regulation Authority ordinances in September 2016 to tackle insider threats. The trustworthiness check by operators started in November 2017.
42	The Conference calls on all States parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ratify the amendment to the Convention as soon as possible and encourages them to act in accordance with the objectives and the	Summary of progress in signing, ratifying and implementing the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment. Summary of efforts to promote the ratification and implementation of the Convention and its 2005 Amendment.	Japan became a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1988 and its 2005 Amendment in 2014. Please see the following page: http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000334.html

Action number	Actions	<i>Examples of information to include (if applicable)</i> <i>Actions taken by Japan</i>
	purpose of the amendment until such time as it enters into force. The Conference also encourages all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention and adopt the amendment as soon as possible.	
43	The Conference urges all States parties to implement the principles of the revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, as well as the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2004.	The IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission to Japan issued its report. Please see section 2.1 (International obligations and arrangements for international cooperation): https://www.isrr.gov.jp/data/000148261.pdf Japan issued a national statement at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit in 2010. Please see the following page: http://japan.kantei.go.jp/hatoyama/statement/20100412statement_e.html
44	The Conference calls upon all States parties to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations, and calls upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in this regard. The Conference also calls upon States parties to establish	Japan's recent matrix regarding the status of its implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), approved by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), is: http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/documents/Japan%20revised%20matrix.pdf Japan made proactive contributions during its presidency of the Global Partnership in 2016. Japan has participated proactively in the Proliferation Security Initiative exercises and meetings. Japan will host the Initiative's maritime interdiction exercise in 2018. Japan hosted the plenary meeting of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in Tokyo in June 2017: http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001613.html

and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.

Information about participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Summary of any reports provided in accordance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

Status of participation in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database.

Status of participation in the nuclear security activities of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

Japan participates in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database and reports when incidents occur.

45

The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.

Summary of progress in signing, ratifying and implementing the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

Japan became a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2007.

46

The Conference encourages IAEA to continue to assist the States parties in strengthening their national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of the State systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, as well as systems on regional level. The Conference calls upon IAEA Member States to broaden their support for

Summary of activities to strengthen national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including establishing and maintaining a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, as well as any regional-level systems. Summary of cooperation with IAEA on accounting and control of nuclear materials.

Summary of support for IAEA programmes relevant to these actions, including the nuclear security relevant work of the IAEA

Japan, through the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security, actively organizes various bilateral seminars and workshops, international training courses for personnel of other member States to enhance the functions of their State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, and some training courses for IAEA personnel, such as a training course on inspection methods for reprocessing processes both at the Japan Atomic Energy Agency experimental facilities and the Tokai Reprocessing Plant.

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
the relevant IAEA programmes, nuclear safety and security programme.			
III. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy			
47	Respect each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.	Summary of the types of peaceful uses of nuclear energy being pursued nationally (e.g., power generation, mining, medical, agricultural).	Japan pursues peaceful uses of nuclear energy in both power applications and various fields of non-power applications under the principle that the use of nuclear power must be accompanied at all its stages by commitments to and ongoing implementation of the highest standards of safety and security and effective safeguards with full transparency.
48	Undertake to facilitate, and reaffirm the right of States parties to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	Summary of national policy on nuclear cooperation, including legislation on export controls.	See action 39.
49	Cooperate with other States parties or international organizations in the further development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.	Summary of national, bilateral, regional and or multilateral efforts to further the development and application of nuclear technologies to areas that will help to meet the needs of developing countries.	See the latest IAEA Technical Cooperation Report for examples of Japanese efforts: https://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/PubAnn-Reports

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
50	Give preferential treatment to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.	Summary of international efforts to assist developing countries, identifying those activities which are undertaken through the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme.	See the latest IAEA Technical Cooperation Report for examples of Japanese efforts: https://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/PubAnn-Reports
51	Facilitate transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty, and eliminate in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty.	List of the total number of countries with which nuclear cooperation agreements are in effect (see actions 37 and 38). List of the total number of nuclear cooperation agreements awaiting implementation.	See action 38.
52	Continue efforts, within IAEA, to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its technical cooperation programme.	Summary of efforts to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, such as by advocating for accountability and transparency in the operation of the Programme, supporting the implementation of recommendations made by the Agency's Office of Internal Oversight Services, etc.	Japan is actively participating in relevant meetings held by IAEA to enhance effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, including of the Board of Governors and General Conference.
53	Strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	Summary of efforts in the IAEA Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee. Summary of efforts to strengthen the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme, including through any voluntary financial or in-kind contributions.	Japan is actively participating in the Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee and Japan has also contributed to the Technical Cooperation Fund and Peaceful Uses Initiative to strengthen the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme.

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
54	Make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable.	Rate of attainment on assessed voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund.	The Japanese rate of attainment with regard to the Technical Cooperation Fund has been 100 per cent continuously.
55	Encourage all States in a position to do so to make additional contributions to the initiative designed to raise 100 million dollars over the next five years as extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA activities, while welcoming the contributions already pledged by countries and groups of countries in support of IAEA activities.	Summary of any voluntary contributions to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative or other extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA.	Japan has contributed over \$28 million to the Peaceful Uses Initiative in total (as of February 2018).
56	Encourage national, bilateral and international efforts to train the necessary skilled workforce needed to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	Summary of national, bilateral and international efforts with regard to capacity-building and human resource development on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	See the below links for examples of Japanese efforts: - Japan Atomic Energy Agency Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (https://www.jaea.go.jp/04_iscn_activity_forum_en.html) - Japan Nuclear Human Resource Development Network (http://jn-hrd-n.jaea.go.jp/en/) - Regional Cooperation Agreement (http://www.rcaro.org/) - IAEA Response and Assistance Network Capacity Building Centre in Fukushima: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-ranet-capacity-building-centre-fukushima-begins-work https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/school-of-radiation-emergency-management-held-in-iaea-capacity-building-centre

Action number	Actions	Examples of information to include (if applicable)	Actions taken by Japan
			https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iaea-course-in-asia-and-pacific-region-focuses-on-the-use-of-radiation-monitoring-for-public-protection-in-a-nuclear-emergency
			https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/japan-to-support-use-of-ndi-technology-for-recovery-from-earthquakes-floods-in-asia-and-the-pacific
57	Ensure that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by commitments to and ongoing implementation of safeguards as well as appropriate and effective levels of safety and security, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations.	Title and date of key national legislation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.	See the below link for examples: IAEA Country Nuclear Power Profiles, 2017 edition: Japan (https://cnpp.iaea.org/countryprofiles/Japan/Japan.htm).
58	Continue to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel	Summary of efforts to develop multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.	See IAEA resolution GC (61) RES.11 entitled "Strengthening the Agency's activities related to nuclear science, technology and applications". Japan supports the resolution. The "Nuclear power applications" in the resolution refer to such items as jointly improving innovations in nuclear reactors and fuel cycles, as well as discussion among interested member States on the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC61/Resolutions/index.html

cycle policies, while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including, in this regard, the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards.

59	Consider becoming party, if they have not yet done so, to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and to ratify its amendment so that it may enter into force at an early date.	Status vis-à-vis the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Status vis-à-vis the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment could be reiterated (see actions 42 and 45).	Japan has already concluded: - Convention on Nuclear Safety (1995) - Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1987) - Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (1987) - Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1988) - Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (2003) - International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2007) - 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2014)
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60

Promote the sharing of best practices in the area of nuclear safety and security, including through dialogue with the nuclear industry and the private sector, as appropriate.

Summarize how international best practices on nuclear safety and security have been implemented nationally.

Summarize any contributions to the IAEA Safety Standards Series, the IAEA Nuclear Security Series and review meetings of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

Summarize any participation in or contributions to workshops to share best practices, including with the nuclear industry, private sector and non-governmental organizations such as the World Institute for Nuclear Security.

Please refer to the national report for the seventh review meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, in 2017:

<https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000170377.pdf>

Please refer to the national report for the fifth review meeting of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, in 2015:

<https://www.nsr.go.jp/data/000110078.pdf>

Japan issued a statement by the Head of the Japanese Delegation, the Minister of State of Cabinet Office, Masaji Matsuyama, to the sixty-first session of the IAEA General Conference, on 18 September 2017:

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000296206.pdf>

Japan issued a statement by the State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kentaro Sonoura, Head of the Delegation of Japan to the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security, on 5 December 2016:

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000209417.pdf>

At that conference, Japan announced its intention to work with IAEA to strengthen Japanese counter-terrorism measures, given that it will host the Olympic and Paralympic Games in Tokyo in 2020. In February 2018, Japan and IAEA signed the Practical Arrangements on Cooperation in the Area of Support to the Implementation of Nuclear Security Measures on the Occasion of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games.

http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/pressrelease/press11e_000021.html

The Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security holds a workshop with the World Institute for Nuclear Security every year. The seventh such workshop was held in Tokyo on 24 and 25 January 2018. The participants discussed what to consider in the early stages of a nuclear security incident, focusing on the interface between safety and security.

Japan issued its National Progress Report, 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. Please see the following page:

61

Encourage States concerned, on a voluntary basis, to further non-urgent

Summarize any national efforts to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear

highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use, where technically and economically feasible.	programmes and/or convert nuclear facilities to low-enriched uranium. Summarize any international assistance provided to other States to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear programmes.	http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofai/files/000/14982.pdf
6.2 Transport radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and environmental protection, and to continue communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.	Summarize national regulations on the transport of radioactive materials, noting in particular the implementation of the IAEA updated standards on transport regulations (No. SSR-6, 2012).	With the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors, the Ship Safety Act, the Civil Aeronautics Act and other national regulations, Japan implements IAEA regulation No. SSR-6, 2012, and other international standards on transport regulations. Shipping States, including Japan, continued communication with coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.
6.3 Put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established by the main pertinent international instruments.	List the date of signature and ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and/or the Paris Convention on Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy. List the title and date of adoption of any national legislation on nuclear liability.	Japan signed and concluded the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage on 15 January 2015. The Convention entered into force on 15 April 2015. Please refer to the following link (IAEA Country Nuclear Power Profiles, 2017 edition; Japan) regarding the status of Japan vis-à-vis international nuclear liability instruments, as well as national legislation on nuclear liability: https://enpp.iaea.org/countryprofiles/Japan/Japan.htm

64

The Conference calls upon all States to abide by the decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on 18 September 2009 on prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.

Summarize national position and efforts taken to prohibit (and prevent) armed attacks on or threats against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes during their operation or while under construction.

Japan issued its National Progress Report: 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. Please see the following page:

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000144982.pdf>

In order to prevent armed attacks on or threats against nuclear facilities, security guards and police officers protect nuclear facilities and conduct regular training to enhance their capability.